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ADMIRALTY IN REM AND IN PERSONAM
PROCEDURES: ARE THEY EXEMPT FROM
COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS?
I. INTRODUCTION
A party believing himself to be the holder of a maritime lien'
against a sea-going craft is in a very powerful position. By institut-
ing an in rem action against the vessel, such a party may, without
notice, severely inconvenience or commercially disable his alleged
debtor, yet himself remain exposed to only a minimum risk of liabil-
ity for the resulting losses. The powerful admiralty in rem action,
although time honored, is becoming the subject of increasing criti-
cism. This supplier of swift and subjective justice is increasingly be-
ing subjected to constitutional scrutiny. How much longer can this
device survive? Should it survive? Conflicting reasoning in two re-
cent cases2 could put the survival of such actions in question.
To arrest property through an admiralty action in rem,3 a per-
son claiming to have a maritime lien against the property need only
file a complaint describing the property to be seized and stating that
the property is or will be within the court's jurisdiction during the
pendency of the action.' The only required verification of the
© 1989 by David James DeMordaunt
1. "[A] privileged claim in a vessel in respect to some service rendered to it in the nature
to facilitate its use in navigation, or an injury caused by the vessel in navigable waters, to be
carried into effect by legal process in the admiralty court." The Westmoor, 27 F.2d 886, 887
(D.C. Or. 1928).
2. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981); Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Dredge General G. L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. "A technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted against the
thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in personam." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. Rule C(2).
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grounds of the charge is an "oath."' Once this simple procedure is
complete, a United States marshall will seize the property identified
in the complaint (usually a maritime craft). The marshall may seize
the craft, even if it is just passing through district waters.' All of this
occurs without any notice7 to the owner of the property and without
judicial scrutiny or authorization of the action.' If the owner of the
incapacitated property contests the validity of the surprise seizure,
the only relief available is a post-arrest hearing in which the plain-
tiff need only show probable cause for the arrest. Upon such a show-
ing, the property remains immobilized.9
An in personam action is a related procedure that provides sim-
ilar advantages for a plaintiff. If the defendant cannot be found
within the district, his property therein may be attached without no-
tice, and he will find himself likewise deprived of property without
having been heard in advance.
The procedural rules that make these actions possible are Sup-
plemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rules B and C. 1" These
5. Id.
6. Waters within which the marshall has the jurisdiction to act. See Republic of Panama
v. United States, 1933 A.M.C. 1662 (General Claims Commission, U.S. and Panama, 1933)
(a vessel's "right of innocent passage" will not protect it from arrest).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. Rule C(4).
8. Id. (a clerk issues the warrant upon filing of the complaint).
9. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550-52 (1965). Although Rule C does not
provide for a post-arrest hearing, it has traditionally been read in light of Rule 12 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, which is made applicable to suits in admiralty through Rule 1 and Rule A.
Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 912 (4th Cir. 1981).
10. 28 U.S.C. Supp. RULES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY & MARITIME CLAIMS reads in
pertinent part:
Rule B. Attachment and Garnishment: Special Provisions
(1) WHEN Available; Complaint, Affidavit, Judicial Authorization, and Process.
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified com-
plaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods and
chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees to be named named in
the process to the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found within
the district. Such a complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit signed by the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney that, to the affiant's knowledge, or to the best
of the affiant's information and belief, the defendant cannot be found within the
district. The verified complaint and affidavit shall be reviewed by the court and,
if the the conditions set forth in this rule appear to exist, an order so stating and
authorizing process of attachment and garnishment shall issue. Supplemental
process enforcing the court's order may be issued by the clerk upon application
without further order of the court. If the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney
certifies that exigent circumstances make review by the court impracticable, the
clerk shall issue a summons and process of attachment and garnishment and the
plaintiff shall have the burden on post-attachment hearing under Rule E(4)(f)
to show that exigent circumstances existed. In addition, or in the alternative, the
plaintiff may, pursuant to Rule 4(e), invoke the remedies provided by state law
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rules have been challenged as unconstitutional on the grounds that
for attachment and garnishment or similar seizure of the defendant's property.
Except for Rule E(8) these Supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies
so invoked.
(2) NOTICE to Defendant. No judgment by default shall be entered except upon
proof, which may be by affidavit, (a) that the plaintiff or the garnishee has
given notice of the action to the defendant by mailing to him a copy of the
complaint, summons, and process of attachment or garnishment, using any form
of mail requiring a return receipt, or (b) that the complaint, summons, and
process of attachment or garnishment have been served on the defendant in a
manner authorized by Rule 4(d) or (i), or (c) that the plaintiff or the garnishee
has made diligent efforts to give notice of the action to the defendant and has
been unable to do so.
(3) ANSWER.
(a) By Garnishee. The garnishee shall serve an answer, together with an-
swers to any interrogatories served with the complaint, within 20 days after
service of process upon the garnishee. Interrogatories to the garnishee may be
served with the complaint without leave of court. If the garnishee refuses or
neglects to answer on oath as to the debts, credits, or effects of the defendant in
the garnishee's hands, or any interrogatories concerning such debts, credits, and
effects that may be propounded by the plaintiff, the court may award compul-
sory process against the garnishee. If the garnishee admits any debts, credits, or
effects, they shall be held in the garnishees hands or paid into the registry of the
court, and shall be held in either case subject to the further order of the court.
(b) By Defendant. The defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days
after process has been executed, whether by attachment of property or service on
the garnishee.
FED. R. Civ. P. Rule B.
Rule C. Actions in Rem: Special Provisions
(1) WHEN AVAILABLE. An action in rem may be brought:
(a) To enforce any maritime lien;
(b) Whenever a statute of the United States provides for a maritime action
in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto.
Except as otherwise provided by law a party who may proceed in rem may
also, or in the alternative, proceed in personam against any person who may be
liable.
Statutory provisions exempting vessels or other property owned or pos-
sessed by or operated by or for the United States from arrest or seizure are not
affected by this rule. When a statute so provides, an action against the United
States or an instrumentality thereof may proceed on in rem principles.
(2) COMPLAINT. In actions in rem the complaint shall be verified on oath or
solemn affirmation. It shall describe with reasonable particularity the property
that is the subject of the action and state that it is within the district or will be
during the pendency of the action. In actions for the enforcement of forfeitures
for violation of any statute of the United States the complaint shall state the
place of seizure and whether it was on land or on navigable waters, and shall
contain such allegations as may be required by the statute pursuant to which
the action is brought.
(3) JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION AND PROCESS. Except in actions by the United
States for forfeitures for federal statutory violations, the verified complaint and
any supporting papers shall be reviewed by the court and, if the conditions for
an action in rem appear to exist, an order so stating and authorizing a warrant
for the arrest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of the action shall
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they violate fifth amendment due process requirements. The fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution forbids the taking of
property without due process of law. Due process requires that a
citizen receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before
issue and be delivered to the clerk who shall prepare the warrant and deliver it
to the marshal for service. If the property that is the subject of the action con-
sists in whole or in part of freight, or the proceeds of property sold, or other
intangible property, the clerk shall issue a summons directing any person having
control of the funds to show cause why they should not be paid into court to
abide the judgment. Supplemental process enforcing the court's order may be
issued by the clerk upon application without further order of the court If the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney certifies that exigent circumstances make re-
view by the court impracticable, the clerk shall issue a summons and warrant
for the arrest and the plaintiff shall have the burden on a post-arrest hearing
under Rule E(4)(f) to show that exigent circumstances existed. In actions by the
United States for forfeitures for federal statutory violations, the clerk, upon the
filing of a complaint, shall forthwith issue summons and warrant for the arrest
of the vessel or other property without requiring a certification of exigent
circumstances.
(4) NOTICE. No notice other than the execution of the process is required when
the property that is the subject of the action has been released in accordance
with Rule E(5). If the property is not released within 10 days after execution of
process, the plaintiff shall promptly or within such time as may be allowed by
the court cause public notice of the action and arrest to be given in a newspaper
of general circulation in the district, designated by order of the court. Such no-
tice shall specify the time within which the answer is required to be filed as
provided by subdivision (6) of this rule. This rule does not affect the require-
ments of notice in actions to foreclose a preferred ship mortgage pursuant to the
Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 30, as amended.
(5) ANCILLARY PROCESS. In any action in rem in which process has been served
as provided by this rule, if any part of the property that is the subject of the
action has not been brought within the control of the court because it has been
removed or sold, or because it is intangible property in the hands of a person
who has not been served with process, the court may, on motion of any person
having possession or control of such property or its proceeds to show cause why
it should not be delivered into the custody of the marshal or paid into court to
abide the judgment; and, after hearing, the court may enter such judgment as
law and justice may require.
(6) CLAIM AND ANSWER; Interrogatories. The claimant of property that is the
subject of an action in rem shall file a claim within 10 days after process has
been executed, or within such additional time as may be allowed by the court,
and shall serve an answer within 20 days after the filing of the claim. The claim
shall be verified on oath or solemn affirmation, and shall state the interest in the
property by virtue of which the claimant demands its restitution and the right to
defend the action. If the claim is made on behalf of the person entitled to posses-
sion by an agent, bailee, or attorney, it shall state that he is duly authorized to
make the claim. At the time of answering the claimant shall also serve answers
to any interrogatories served with the complaint. In actions in rem interrogato-
ries may so be served without leave of court.
FED. R. Civ. P. Rule C.
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property is taken from that person."
Notwithstanding constitutional due process requirements, the
United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in the case of Amstar
Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T. 2 and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
in the case of Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. The Dredge
General G.L. Gillespie" both upheld the constitutionality of the ad-
miralty in rem proceeding. Coincidentally, the two cases were de-
cided virtually simultaneously, and although both courts upheld the
procedures, the two decisions include some disparate reasoning. The
Amstar court maintained that maritime procedures were indepen-
dent of due process requirements. 4 The Merchants National Bank
court held that even if maritime in rem actions were subject to due
process requirements, they were constitutional under an "extraordi-
nary situation" exception. 5
This comment will first examine the background of these en-
forcement devices for maritime claims, their maritime common law
history, and recent procedural and constitutional developments. The
comment will then address the issues and difficulties presented by
the conflicting elements of the Amstar and Merchants National
Bank cases. The discussion will focus on the concerns of current and
future litigants who might wish to take advantage of maritime, and
specifically maritime in rem procedures. Following this discussion is
an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing either
the Amstar or the Merchants National Bank reasoning as a foun-
tainhead for future decisional law. Finally, specific suggestions for
successfully resolving potential difficulties and preserving maritime
autonomy will be proposed.
II. BACKGROUND
A maritime lien has long been one of the most enforceable
claims in civil law. 6 A plaintiff suing in a maritime court may find
several procedural advantages that would be unavailable had the
claim arisen under common law. The differences between maritime
11. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-16 (1950).
12. 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981).
13. 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
14. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
16. See McCreary, Going for the Jugular Vein: Arrests and Attachments in Admiralty,
28 OHIo ST. L.J. 19, 19-20 (1967) (wherein a melodramatic narration of a hypothetical sur-
prise seizure of a vessel at midnight introduces the article). An in rem action to enforce a
maritime lien is termed as one of "the two most drastic remedies known to modern civil law
. .. Id  at 19.
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law and common law have long been recognized by Congress and the
courts.17 The nation's legal system has been fashioned to accommo-
date the unique and traditional needs of the maritime community.'"
As a result, the law has left the maritime lien relatively unchanged
from its ancient origins in substantive maritime law. Even today, al-
though the operation of a maritime lien is often procedurally af-
fected, the lien is seen as a creature of age-old substantive maritime
law, not procedural maritime law. 9
A maritime lien may arise as the result of the commission of a
maritime tort, the breach of a maritime contract, an act of salvage, or
general average.20 Typical cases include seamen suing for unpaid
wages 21 or suits for unpaid repair and maintenance bills for work
done on a vessel."
Two ancient and very effective procedural tools for enforcing
maritime liens are the in rem arrest of a vessel, and the in personam
attachment of property. If a plaintiff has acquired a maritime lien
under maritime law, or if the lien is created by statute, an action in
rem may be brought by arresting the maritime property against
which the lien is held.2" Frequently, a plaintiff will proceed in rem
against a vessel while simultaneously proceeding in personam
against the vessel's owner in the same action. 4 An action in per-
17. When empowering the Supreme Court to issue and execute procedural rules, Con-
gress provided: "[Tihe forms of writs, executions and other process . . . [in suits of) . . .
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction [shall be] according to the principles, rules and usages
which belong to the courts . . . of admiralty . . . as contradistinguished from the courts of
common law . Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
18. Id.
19. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 908 (4th Cir. 1981). This means
that maritime liens were not originally created by the rules in which they are now embodied.
They are not procedural in origin. "Beneficial liens arise out of the operation of the law which
creates them . . . . They are . . . enforceable in admiralty, but not having their origin in the
court, or owing their meritorious character to its process." Saylor v. Taylor, 77 F. 476, 480
(4th Cir. 1896).
20. BENEDICT ON ADMIRALITY §§ 87-88 (6th ed. 1940). "Salvage" refers to the right
of equitable remuneration conferred upon the performer of an act of maritime assistance which
yields a useful and beneficial result to a seagoing vessel in danger. N. HEALY & D. SHARPE,
infra note 38, at 660-61. "General average" refers to the time honored principle that if some
of the goods aboard a ship must be sacrificed in order to insure safety of the voyage, the loss
will be shared by all for whom the benefit was intended. N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, infra note
38, at 698-99.
21. Traditionally, liens held by seamen for unpaid wages have taken precedence over all
other maritime liens or claims attached to a vessel. Saylor, 77 F. at 476.
22. A "vessel" for the purposes of invoking admiralty jurisdiction and thus possibly in
rem proceedings can include independently immobile structures placed in a body of water. Id.
at 477.
23. McCreary, supra note 16, at 20.
24. In Amstar, the plaintiff effectively combined the two procedures by having the craft
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sonam is distinguished from the action in rem in several ways.
A. In Personam Actions
An action in personam with a prayer for attachment is brought
by a plaintiff offering an affidavit. The affidavit should state that the
defendant is not to be found within the district and the plaintiff re-
quires, for the security of his claim, the attachment of the defend-
ant's "goods and chattels, or credits and effects ... ."" Attachment
is permitted only when a good faith effort fails to procure the de-
fendant within the district. Although the plaintiffs claim must be
maritime in nature, possessing a maritime lien is not a prerequisite
for initiating in personam proceedings.26
Certain cases,27 which have established the jurisdictional limits
of the common law, may affect maritime in personam proceedings.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,8 the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that a defendant must have certain minimum
contacts with a state before that state can exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant. Later in Shaffer v. Heitner,29 the Court declared that
even the statutory presence of defendant's property in the forum
state was insufficient to confer jurisdiction if the property was unre-
lated to the underlying litigation. The potential for these decisions to
impact admiralty law was forstalled by Judge Beeks in Grand Ba-
hama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transportation Agencies,
Ltd."3 The court there held the Shaffer rationale inapplicable to Ad-
miralty Rule B(1). The judge held that the autonomy of admiralty
law is constitutionally protected, both analytically3 and histori-
cally, 2 its origin being in the "remotest history."
Not even one year after Judge Beeks so thoroughly defended
admiralty law's immunity from common law principles, Judge Mac-
arrested pursuant to Rule C, and attached pursuant to Rule B. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexan-
dros T., 664 F.2d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1981).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. Rule B (decl'd unconst. in part in Grand Bahama Petroleum Co.
v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447, 459-60 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982)).
26. McCreary, supra note 16, at 20-21.
27. See infra notes 28-29.
28. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
29. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
30. 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
31. Analytically, Judge Beeks pointed out the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdic-
tion independent of law and equity jurisdiction to the federal courts. Id. at 453.
32. Historically, the judge noted that the origin of admiralty attachments can be traced
back to the remote ages of civil law. Id. at 454 (citing Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. 473, 489
(1825)).
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Mahon in Engineering Equipment Co. v. SIS Selene"3 dealt a se-
vere blow to admiralty law autonomy by holding that Shaffer was in
fact applicable to maritime attachment.84
Judicial opinion is divided over the issue of common law appli-
cability to maritime matters. 5 Some cases take the Grand Bahama
stance that admiralty is separate from and undisturbed by common
law precedent. Other courts find the Grand Bahama holding creates
a double standard, arbitrarily giving increased protection to persons
involved in maritime matters."6
B. In Rem Actions
The in rem action has been a common procedure in courts of
admiralty since the 1600's. 1' At that time, admiralty courts had no in
personam jurisdiction,88 so their relief-giving capacity was confined
to the in rem procedure of arresting and selling maritime property,
then dividing the proceeds among the unpaid creditors. 9 Thus, the
in rem procedure was used in maritime actions long before it was
promulgated by rules."' Unlike the in personam action, an action in
rem can only be brought by a plaintiff who has acquired a lien
under statutory or maritime law. Jurisdiction for an in rem action
seeking enforcement of a maritime lien lies only under the federal
court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 1 In an in rem action,
the attached property itself is named as the defendant, so it is imma-
terial whether or not the owner of the property can be found within
the district.'8 If a potentially liable person is jurisdictionally within
the plaintiff's reach, plaintiff can proceed in personam against that
party while at the same time proceeding in rem against the arrested
property. 3
Traditional admiralty procedures have long enjoyed judicial ap-
33. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
34. The court held that an inquiry must be made as to whether or not a defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States for jurisdiction over that defendant to be
justified according to the standards of Shaffer. Id. at 709.
35. See Amstar v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 908 n.10 (4th Cir. 1981).
36. 450 F. Supp. 447, 459 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
37. Id.
38. N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, ADMIRALTY, CASES AND MATERIALS 61-62 (1986).
39. Id.
40. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 908 n.16 (4th Cir. 1981).
41. Rogers, Enforcement of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REV. 767, 768
(1973).
42. McCreary, supra note 16, at 20.
43. McCreary, supra note 16, at 20. See Amstar, 664 F.2d at 906 (plaintiff effectively
combined the two procedures).
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proval."' Although they were not authorized by any particular stat-
ute for over one hundred years, the procedures were nonetheless au-
thorized by the Supreme Court Rules." In 1870, Justices Wells and
Douglas, in the case of Page v. United States,"' dealt concisely with
a challenge to the validity of admiralty in rem proceedings in a short
paragraph: "In admiralty or revenue proceedings in rem, seizure is
made necessary to give the court jurisdiction.' 7 In 1966, the Su-
preme Court amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in or-
der to unify the civil and admiralty procedures, by rescinding the
former admiralty rules of the Supreme Court. Today, maritime in
rem proceedings are embodied in Supplemental Admiralty and Mar-
itime Claims Rules C and E."
For centuries, those employed in maritime fields have benefitted
by the ability to seek satisfaction for maritime liens with an in rem
action. 9 Only recently has the in rem proceeding come under consti-
tutional attack."0
C. Objections to In Rem Actions
Judicial and academic criticism to admiralty actions in rem can
be separated into two general objections:
1. Admiralty in rem actions are based on an illogical and illegit-
imate premise.
2. Admiralty in rem actions conflict with constitutional guaran-
tees of due process.
The first objection is grounded in the fact that the admiralty
action in rem operates through "personification." This means the
vessel itself is named as the defendant. This legal fiction has per-
sisted largely due to its sheer practicality and the efficiency with
which it remedies maritime injustice. With this in mind, it is not
surprising that much of the criticism of admiralty in rem actions on
the conceptual level comes from academic sources 1 and not judges,
who regularly make practical use of the in rem action and overlook
44. McCreary, supra note 16, at 21.
45. McCreary, supra note 16, at 21.
46. 78 U.S. 268 (1870).
47. Id. at 269.
48. See supra note 10.
49. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
51. See Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 165 (1919) (there
can be no legal relation between a thing and a person). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 102 (1971) (for an exercise of judicial jurisdiction to be valid, it must affect
the interests of persons (emphasis added)).
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its foundation of legal fiction.5" The fiction's continuing survival sug-
gests that it serves a substantial utility and is more than "an animal-
istic survival from remote times . . .-.
The real challenge facing maritime in rem actions comes from
the second category of objections, those questioning the constitutional
validity of the proceeding. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,"'
spawned a series of decisions commonly known as the Sniadach-
Fuentes line of cases. 5 These decisions supply the foundation for
recent constitutional attacks on admiralty in rem proceedings. The
Sniadach-Fuentes cases were not maritime in nature. Instead, they
involved common law.56 The cases dealt with the constitutionality of
certain state laws providing for the seizure of a debtor's property
prior to judgment.
In Sniadach, for example, a Wisconsin statute authorizing a
wage garnishment procedure that gave neither notice nor a prior
hearing to the alleged debtor was struck down by the Supreme
Court.57 This decision charted the direction of later Supreme Court
decisions in the Sniadach-Fuentes line, which refined judicial protec-
tion against deprivation of property without due process of law.
The cases lead to an increased judicial protection of property.
Fuentes v. Shevin5" expanded the protection afforded wages by Snia-
dach to cover any property, and found both Florida and Pennsylva-
nia prejudgment replevin statutes unconstitutional.59 Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co.60 tempered somewhat the systematic expansion of
protection by holding that a Louisiana sequestration statute6" was
52. One example of judicial disapproval of an in rem action on a conceptual basis is
found in Place v. City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886). "To say that an owner is not liable,
but that his vessel is liable, seems to us like talking in riddles." Id. at 503.
53. The Carlotta, 48 F.2d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1931) (the court also referred to the in rem
fiction as "irrational" and "archaic"). Id.
54. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
55. The Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases typically consists of Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337
(1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). Some scholars
also place Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) in the list. Batiza & Partridge, The Consti-
tutional Challenqe to Maritime Seizures, 26 Loy. L. REV. 203, 204 (1980).
56. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 908 (4th Cir. 1981).
57. 395 U.S. at 340-42.
58. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
59. Id. at 83-84 (replevin statutes provide for the return of wrongfully obtained
property).
60. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
61. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. arts. 281-3, 325, 2373, 3501, 3504, 2506-8, 3510, 3571,
3574, 3576 (West 1960) (sequestration statutes permit the attachment of property or funds
pending the outcome of litigation).
[Vol. 29
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constitutional because of the procedural safeguards it afforded. 2 The
case showed that a carefully constructed seizure statute could remain
constitutional, though it did not provide a preseizure hearing.
A prejudgment seizure rule might also be constitutional if it in-
cluded certain procedural safeguards and was applied only in "ex-
traordinary situations,"6 according to dictum in Fuentes. The Court
in Mitchell relied on a relaxed version of the Fuentes standards for
determining constitutionality. The existence of procedural safeguards
was sufficient for the Court to find the statute constitutional, despite
the lack of an extraordinary situation.
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di Chem, Inc.," the Court
analyzed a Georgia garnishment statute and found it unconstitu-
tional. The Court arrived at its conclusion by using a "balancing
test" that it perceived as having evolved through the Sniadach,
Fuentes and Mitchell opinions. 35
Therefore, although the Sniadach line of cases has produced no
uniform rule that assists in predicting the outcome of a due process
denial case, the line of cases has generally resulted in a heightened
level of judicial protection against the taking of property without
some form of due process. Exceptions are now made only for fact
patterns involving special procedural safeguards and/or extraordi-
nary circumstances.
Some scholars have attempted to expand the Sniadach-Fuentes
line of cases by adding cases to the four original cases in the line,
thus extending the decisional evolution in various directions.66 In an
admiralty context, however, these expansions may be moot in view of
62. The redeeming procedural safeguards found in Mitchell consisted of: (1) a judge (as
opposed to a clerk or similar underling) issued the writ; (2) specific facts, not conclusions, had
to be alleged in the affidavit; (3) the alleged debtor could compel the plaintiff to prove he was
entitled to attach the property. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 605-07.
63. The Fuentes opinion provided for the "extraordinary situation" exception on the
condition that certain procedural safeguards were also present: (1) the direct necessity of the
seizure to secure an important governmental or public interest; (2) that promptness be espe-
cially necessary; and (3) that strict control be kept by the state over its monopoly of legitimate
force. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-92.
64. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
65. Id. at 606-07; see also Batiza & Partridge, supra note 55, at 209.
66. In The Constitutional Challenge to Maritime Seizures, Batiza and Partridge follow
the jurisdictional implications of the Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases by adding Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) to
the line of cases. Batiza & Partridge, supra note 55, at 209-11. In The Constitutionality of
Maritime Attachment, the author structured his analysis almost entirely on the jurisdictional
implications of Shaffer, distinguishing it as an entirely separate point from which to constitu-
tionally attack maritime attachment. McNamara, The Constitutionality of Maritime Attach-
ment, 12 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 97 (1980).
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the recent decisions in Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T.6" and
Merchants National Bank v. Dredge Gen. G. L. Gillespie.68 These
decisions may be the most important cases dealing with the constitu-
tionality of admiralty in in rem proceedings to date.
D. The Amstar and Merchants National Bank Cases
In Amstar, the plaintiff brought suit to recover losses resulting
from damaged cargo. 9 The plaintiff sued the vessel Alexandros T.
in rem and at the same time, sued the vessel's owner, Nava Shipping
Co., Ltd. in personam, thus both arresting and attaching the vessel."0
Defendant, Nava Shipping Co., made a special appearance and
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming Rules B and C
were unconstitutional. The district court upheld the rules and Nava
appealed. On appeal, Judge Butzner of the Fourth Circuit decided
the case solely on the in rem issue, leaving the in personam issues
unanswered.
7 1
For the in rem portion of their case, Nava relied on the Snia-
dach-Fuentes line of cases, claiming that the arrest of the Alexandros
T. was an unconstitutional deprivation of property prior to judg-
ment.71 In its decision, the court opted not to apply a Sniadach-
Fuentes balancing test to Rule C, as some courts in admiralty cases
have done.7 Instead, they eliminated the need for such analysis at an
early stage by adhering to the Grand Bahama viewpoint that admi-
ralty is an autonomous field of law, distinct from common law.74
The court noted the significant fact that no cases in the Sniadach-
Fuentes line dealt at all with maritime law and practice. 5
The Amstar court's holding that Sniadach and its progeny were
not controlling precedent did not excuse the Amstar court from ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of Rule C. It merely freed the court from
67. 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981).
68. 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. The ship's cargo of raw sugar sustained damage.when the ship encountered heavy
weather and water leaked through rusty hatch covers on deck. 664 F.2d at 912.
70. Id. at 906.
71. Id. at 907. (Judge Butzner declared he did not want the Amstar decision to be
unnecessarily broad.).
72. Id. at 906 n.6.
73. Engineering Equip. Co. v. S/S Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) discussed
an example of a court in admiralty importing common law Sniadach-Fuentes balancing crite-
ria to determine the constitutionality of maritime procedural rules. See also Amstar, 664 F.2d
at 908 n.10.
74. Id. at 908.
75. Id. at 909. The court noted for emphasis that the Sniadach-Fuentes cases had nearly
two centuries worth of admiralty in rem case decisions to refer to had they desired to do so.
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being bound by Sniadach-Fuentes standards of procedural due pro-
cess. The Amstar court then proceeded to examine Rule C's consti-
tutionality in the context of the court's autonomous admiralty juris-
diction. The court found the procedural safeguards in an admiralty
in rem action sufficient in light of the action's maritime legacy and
its necessity.
In the other recent case regarding maritime lien enforcement,
Merchants National Bank, two plaintiffs effectuated an in rem fore-
closure on the mortgages of preferred ships. A motion to vacate
seizure was denied, and on appeal, the interlocutory sale was held
justified. Prejudgment sales procedures were held not to violate the
due process requirements of the fifth amendment. Unlike the Amstar
decision, the holding was not couched entirely in the independence of
admiralty law from due process requirements.
The opinion also stated that admiralty in rem actions had suffi-
cient procedural safeguards,"' and were "extraordinary situations" 8
for the purpose of qualifying for corresponding common law pre-
judgment seizure exceptions.7 9 The court cited the Sniadach-Fuentes
line of cases in establishing the support for its holding.80 The court
did consider espousing an Amstar-style, autonomy approach and
noted that such a view was urged in an amicus curiae brief submit-
ted to the court by the Maritime Law Association of the United
States.81
III. ANALYSIS
In the Merchants National Bank decision, Judge Brown began
the opinion by noting that "[t]his case presents, for the first time to
any United States Court of Appeals, . . . the issue of the Constitu-
tionality of Admiralty Rules C and E, concerning the in rem seizure
of a vessel without a preliminary judicial hearing.'' 82 This introduc-
tion is somewhat misleading, for despite a lack of involvement by the
United States courts of appeal, there nonetheless has been much ju-
dicial controversy over the constitutionality of the admiralty rules
76. Id. at 910-13.
77. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dredge General G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1350-51
(5th Cir. 1981).
78. Id. at 1348.
79. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
80. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 663 F.2d at 1348.
81. Id. at 1349-50.
82. Id. at 1339.
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governing the procedure for enforcement of maritime claims."
A. Should Admiralty Be Subject to Common Law?
In the most recent cases dealing with the issue of maritime au-
tonomy, Amstar and Merchants National Bank, the degree to which
common law precedent controlled the outcome of maritime actions
was a key issue. Each case handled the problem in a different way,
thus creating a potentially confusing set of court of appeals prece-
dents. The Merchants National Bank court examined the procedure,
in part, in terms of common law, Sniadach-Fuentes precedent. This
required the court somehow to help the in rem action escape consti-
tutional scrutiny as an "extraordinary situation." In such a situation,
the taking of property without traditional due process is, according
to Fuentes, permissible. The court cited some district court cases84
supporting the conclusion that the ancient and commonplace in rem
procedure is considered an "extraordinary situation" per se. The
court offered very little persuasive reasoning of its own for adopting
such a conclusion.
85
Meanwhile, apparently unaware that the Fifth Circuit was for-
mulating a decision applying the Sniadach-Fuentes common law
principles to Rule C, the Fourth Circuit offered this assertion in the
dictum of Amstar: "We have little doubt that Rule C would be inva-
lid if its constitutionality were to be measured . . by the principles
explained in Sniadach . . . ."86 On this premise, the Amstar court
went on to write an opinion finding that admiralty courts were not
bound to follow common law precedent.
The issue of common law effect on maritime procedures is now
especially important. After Merchants National Bank, this issue de-
termines the amount of "stretching" a court might need to do in or-
der to preserve the maritime procedure (until it is challenged again
under ever evolving common law principles). After Amstar, the effect
of common law precedent on maritime actions is very important be-
cause according to the court's reasoning, if admiralty were affected,
the long history of in rem actions would come to a grinding halt.8"
83. Even as the Merchants Nat'l Bank decision was pending, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit issued the Amstar decision. Id. at 1339.
84. Id. at 1348-49 (citing Central Soya Co., Inc. v. Cox Towing Corp., 417 F. Supp.
658, 661 (N.D. Miss. 1976); A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi v. The Tug Boat Condor, 1979
A.M.C. 1696 (S.D. Cal. 1979)).
85. Id.
86. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 907 (4th Cir. 1981).
87. Id.
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For all practical purposes, the continued constitutionality of these
procedures depends largely upon the extent to which common law
precedent affects them in admiralty proceedings.
Therefore, some confusion exists for the prospective litigant
wishing to enforce a maritime claim. Despite the often controlling
influence common law may have, a party entering court today cannot
be sure whether common law precedent will be applied as was
deemed acceptable in Merchants National Bank or will not be ap-
plied as in Amstar.
Initially, one might question the significance of this dichotomy,
since the results have been the same under the two theories: follow-
ing Amstar, the plaintiff avoids the common law barrier; following
Merchants National Bank, the plaintiff meets the common law bar-
rier, then simply wriggles through a convenient exception. This rea-
soning, however, ignores the volatile nature of common law and the
general manner in which the Sniadach-Fuentes cases have increased
judicial protection from pre-trial seizure of personal property.
Therefore, although Rule C was found constitutional according to
common law standards existing at the time Merchants National
Bank was decided, there is no guarantee that fifth amendment con-
siderations will not expand to the point that Rule C can no longer
rationally be found constitutional under them.
The conflict between Amstar and Merchants National Bank
regarding successful common law applicability thus remains cause
for concern for today's prospective litigant, because in each case, the
issue of common law applicability may determine the continued con-
stitutionality of maritime lien enforcement procedures. Explicitly in
Amstar and implicitly in Merchants National Bank, the constitu-
tionality of maritime lien enforcement procedures hinges on the ap-
plicability of common law precedent.
1. Support for Common Law Application
Several arguments have been advanced in support of the pro-
position that common law precedent applies to help guide the en-
forcement of maritime claims. Perhaps the most persuasive of these
arguments is the familiar notion that all citizens should be treated
equally under the law, that it is unfair to give unusual advantages to
certain plaintiffs and unusual disadvantages to certain defendants. In
Grand Bahama, Judge Beeks seemed to be persuaded by this no-
tion. He wrote, "I can find no indication that maritime defendants
may be constitutionally due less procedural protection against the
19891
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mistaken deprivation of property than non-maritime defendants."' ..
Another argument that common law precedent should have in-
fluence in maritime courts is that perhaps the characteristics of ad-
miralty law that once justified its autonomy are today not so unique
to admiralty. In opinions defending the constitutionality of Rules B
and C, courts invariably refer to the "special needs of persons en-
gaged in . ..maritime commerce."89 However, rarely are details
given to show why this concept militates admiralty's exclusion from
common law.
Is a modern holder of a maritime claim in a position so drasti-
cally different from holders of other property rights? In ancient
times, the mobility possessed by a ship, and thus its ability to move
out of a court's jurisdiction, were perhaps characteristics more
unique to shipping than they are today. Of course the "flight from
jurisdiction" problem still exists in admiralty today, but the problem
is much less unique to admiralty in modern society. The fact that in
this jet age of unprecedented mobility an item is mobile should not
make it so unique to exempt it from traditional constitutional re-
quirements. The suggestion that constitutional requirements do not
apply to highly mobile things is curious. In the modern world, such
a rule would exempt a tremendous amount of litigation from com-
mon law standards of constitutional protection. Rather than open
this pandora's box, courts usually only refer to the "exigencies of
maritime commerce"9 or "the highly mobile res"9 and offer little
analysis as to what separates maritime mobility from other mobile
property. Perhaps the once compelling justification for keeping a
body of law immune from common law constitutional interpretation
no longer exists.
To bind maritime law so tightly to its ancient roots seems espe-
cially unwise in light of the notion that the law should be adaptable
to the ever-changing needs of society. In all other areas of the law,
the rights of property owners to be protected from improper depriva-
tion of property have increased as society has matured.
The final argument supporting the application of common law
to maritime attachment is the assertion that traditional maritime
claim enforcement procedures are not significantly distinguishable
88. 450 F. Supp. 447, 456 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
89. See Amstar, 664 F.2d at 909.
90. Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admiralty Rules: Why and How, 17 ME. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1965).
91. Cooper Shipping Co. v. Century 21 Exposition, No. 82-535-Civ-T-GC (M.D. Fla.
1982).
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from the practice of exercising jurisdiction over property by mere
virtue of its location within a jurisdiction. This practice was struck
down in Shaffer v. Heitner.92 It is questionable whether the lengthy
history (the oft cited redeeming factor) of maritime attachments
would suffice to preserve their constitutionality. The procedure
struck down in Shaffer also had a long history. 3 In fact, the Shaffer
Court was not at all hesitant to eliminate "an ancient form without
substantial modern justification."94
Thus, it is possible that the two principle defenses for admiralty
autonomy, unique character and ancient history, are not sufficient to
justify continued maritime immunity from the constitutional stan-
dards that guide the nation's common law.
2. Support For Autonomy
There are also persuasive arguments against the application of
common law precedent, and for maritime autonomy. First, there is
much to be said for the sheer judicial practicality of maritime in rem
and in personam arrests and attachments. Most of the arguments for
imposing common law constraints are highly theoretical and do not
stem from the natural demands of the legal system. Those observers
attempting to justify the autonomy of admiralty, however, refer
quickly to the "real world" need for maritime lien-holders to obtain
a guarantee for their claim in a timely fashion. Indeed, perhaps the
only thing explaining the ancient origin and modern survival of a
procedure such as the maritime in rem action, which as far back as
1931 had already been attacked as an irrational, archaic fiction with
"an animalistic survival from remote times . . .-," is its undeniable
utility. Courts often view these procedures as "practical, problem-
solving device[s] [that] retain importance in contemporary admiralty
law."96
The ancient legacy of these maritime procedures alone is seen
by many courts as a significant reason for allowing them to continue,
unhampered by comparatively infantile common law trends. It was
principally the long history of maritime attachment that kept it free
from the common law constraints of Shaffer in Grand Bahama.9" In
92. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
93. McNamara, supra note 66, at 100.
94. 433 U.S. at 212.
95. The Carlotta, 848 F.2d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1931).
96. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dredge General G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1343 (4th
Cir. 1981).
97. 450 F. Supp. 447, 453-54 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
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cases involving the validity of maritime attachment, a great deal of
attention is invariably paid to the ancient roots of modern attach-
ment procedures.
The independence of admiralty from the common law can be
justified by more than just its utility and history. The Constitution
confers upon the federal courts jurisdiction of admiralty and mari-
time cases independent of law and equity jurisdiction.9" This grant
of jurisdiction has been interpreted as immunizing substantive mari-
time law, including maritime lien matters, from common law influ-
ence.99 For the judiciary to now proclaim that maritime law must be
significantly bound by common law standards would contravene the
clear intent of the Constitution.
Another argument for admiralty autonomy is the fact that com-
mon law cases are not decided with an eye toward their potiential
impact on admiralty law and maritime practices.' 00 This argument
served as an essential feature in the reasoning of the Amstar case,
but has received little attention in other cases. The Amstar court
kept in rem arrests free from common law control in part because
the Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases (1) did not involve maritime con-
cepts in their substance, and (2) did not refer at all to maritime law
and practice or the nearly 200 years worth of written decisions re-
garding admiralty suits in rem.'0 1
Traditionally, common law precedent has not controlled actions
in admiralty.'0 2 It may be inadvisable to now apply common law
decisions in forums and to situations not contemplated by the formu-
lators of the decisions. This would give unintended meaning and
scope to the past decisions of common law judges. By adopting a
policy of importing past common law, more than just the traditional
structure of admiralty law would be damaged. Such a policy would
undermine the very premise of stare decisis. How reliable is deci-
sional law if the parameters in which it ultimately operates are never
clearly established? A policy of importing common law into admi-
ralty would place all previous common law judges in the unfair and
unstable position of having given an answer before being asked the
question. Looking forward, the implications are worse still. Common
law judges, plaintiffs, and defendants in cases factually unrelated to
98. Id. at 455.
99. McCreary, supra note 16, at 22-23.
100. Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 909 (4th Cir. 1981).
101. Id.
102. Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Trans. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp.
447, 453-54 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
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admiralty would potentially become subject to admiralty considera-
tions. Is this a burden that common law judges should have to bear
while trying to mete out justice to the litigants before them? Com-
mon law and admiralty law would both suffer from such an
arrangement. 1O3
Judicial efficiency in courts of admiralty would also suffer as a
result of applying common law control over maritime actions. The
essential features of maritime law could survive only through the ad-
miralty courts painstakingly weighing the application of a rule of
maritime law case-by-case against each new common law standard.
For example, the Merchants National Bank case, insofar as it de-
fended maritime in rem actions on common law grounds, succeeded
in protecting in rem actions only until they are challenged again
under a new wrinkle of common law. At that time, if the court still
wished to preserve the in rem action, it would have no choice but to
roll up its sleeves and dig in once again. No matter how much effort
a court spent securing the survival of a maritime procedure, the solu-
tion could only be a temporary one, since common law, by nature, is
an ever-evolving collection of legal precepts. In other words, there is
no guarantee, for example, that the "extraordinary situation" excep-
tion to seizure without notice will not be struck down as unconstitu-
tional by a future court. In that event, a court in admiralty may have
difficulty preserving the constitutionality of maritime in rem and in
personam actions, according to common law standards. The histori-
cal stability and predictability of these maritime procedures would
vanish if their continued validity was made to hinge on their compat-
ibility with decisional standards made in a non-admiralty, common
law context.
B. The Current Influence of Common Law
To what extent are maritime lien enforcement matters now con-
trolled by common law precedent? The Amstar and Merchants Na-
tional Bank decisions hold some answers to this question. The issue
of common law influence is one of key importance in both cases,
although it is handled differently in each. The result of this is a
possible conflict of law in this area. Not only do Amstar and
Merchants National Bank contain theoretically incompatible ele-
103. The fear of devastating some essential feature of admiralty law could alter the
decision a common law judge would otherwise make. Alternatively, the judge could be as fair
as possible to the litigants before him and inadvertently devastate some essential feature of
admiralty law.
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ments, but each case is also internally inconsistent on the issue. This
section of the comment will first look at the issue as it is handled in
the cases individually, and will then examine the state of common
law influence on maritime lien enforcement by comparing the two
cases.
1. The Amstar Decision
Amstar can be regarded as supporting the proposition of mari-
time independence from common law precedent. However, three ba-
sic aspects of the case leave unclear Amstar's position on the influ-
ence of common law on admiralty. A detailed discussion of each of
the three aspects will follow the following introductory statements of
each:
1. Despite broad and generalized support for the ruling, the
holding on the issue was very narrowly constructed.
2. The court declined to extend its holding of common law ex-
clusion to the in personam issue.'"
3. The court nonetheless relied on common law constitutional
standards to reach its decision.
The decision in Amstar, upholding the constitutionality of the
maritime in rem action, was premised on the conclusion that admi-
ralty matters must be judged in light of their nautical background
and that common law principles "cannot be applied mechanically to
test the validity of Rule C."10 5 The court explicitly declared that the
Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases did not apply to the in rem enforce-
ment of maritime liens. Nonetheless, the Amstar opinion did, in
some ways, leave the issue of common law applicability very open.
The court laid a very broad foundation for its conclusion,
speaking in general terms of "the significant differences between the
common law and admiralty."10 6 The actual conclusion given by the
court on the issue, however, was quite narrowly constructed. "[W]e
cannot accept Nava's argument that Sniadach and related cases pro-
vide controlling precedent for this appeal. ' 10 7
This apparently narrow holding, however, may be viewed as
more than just an ad hoc conclusion. The holding is not the result of
104. The court did not rule on the issue.
105. 664 F.2d 904, 909 (4th Cir. 1981).
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
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any unusual factual circumstances surrounding Amstar, but of broad
conclusions about the relationship of common law to admiralty.
Therefore, the holding may be viewed as a broad conclusion about
the relationship of common law to admiralty, or the lack of such a
relationship. Whether or not the Amstar holding on this issue was
meant to be a sweeping policy statement or a one-time conclusion,
additional elements of Amstar leave room for a continued common
law influence on maritime matters.
First, the Amstar court specifically declined to extend its hold-
ing to the question of in personam attachment also raised in the
case.'08 It is interesting that the court would take such pains to spell
out the importance of maintaining autonomy for maritime law, yet
pass up the opportunity to protect the in personam action against the
same erosion of maritime autonomy visited upon its sister action, the
in rem arrest. The foundation used by the court to support the in
rem defense was certainly broad enough to have covered in personam
actions.' 09 Aside from the final holding and the initial Rule B dis-
claimer, the Amstar opinion dealt very generally with common law
applicability to maritime liens, not just in rem actions.
Thus, it is difficult to determine exactly where the Amstar court
stood on the issue of importing common law into the courts of admi-
ralty. While the court disallowed importation only in the case before
it, it used reasoning which strongly suggests a policy of general disal-
lowal. This leaves some room for argument about the future applica-
tion of common law.
Just why the court took such a confusing stance on that initial
issue is explained somewhat by the second major portion of the case.
Defendant Nava complained that the in rem arrest of its vessel vio-
lated its constitutional right to due process before being deprived of
property."' The court devoted the first half of its opinion to ruling
that the Sniadach-Fuentes constitutional standards of due process
advocated by Nava did not apply to the case."' The supporting rea-
soning was couched not in any particular objection to the Sniadach-
Fuentes standards, but in the conclusion that common law simply
could not apply to the unique needs of maritime courts. The Amstar
court then proceeded, as if it were bound to do so, to vindicate the
due process provided by maritime in rem actions, using standards set
108. Id. at 907.
109. Id. at 909.
110. Id. at 910.
11. Id.
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out in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 1 1 2 which is
common law precedent. The court did not acknowledge the theoreti-
cal inconsistency in resting the case on common law constitutional
grounds just after declaring admiralty to be a body of law not prop-
erly governed by common law constitutional standards. No reason
was given explaining why the standards of Mullane were proper for
an admiralty ruling, while the Sniadach-Fuentes constitutional stan-
dards were not.
Amstar, then, leaves the control of common law over admiralty
matters in an arguably unpredictable state. Under Amstar, maritime
courts are apparently free to adopt portions of common law found
conducive to the desired end, and to reject, on very generalized
grounds, common law standards inconvenient to the desired result.
While this is the theoretical result of Amstar, the practical result is
that courts have used"'2 and will continue to use Amstar for the gen-
eral proposition that common law standards do not apply to admi-
ralty actions in rem. Predictably, this principle has also spilled over
to uphold the constitutionality of Rule B."14 Although the Amstar
court refrained from taking this step, no reasoning in the case stood
in the way of this expansion of the Amstar holding.
Amstar and Merchants National Bank are often cited as sup-
porting the same proposition: the constitutionality of Rule C. How-
ever, while the same result may have been reached in each case, the
paths taken in reaching the identical end are, in some respects, theo-
retically incompatible.
While Amstar candidly proclaimed that Rule C would be un-
constitutional if measured by the criteria established in the Snia-
dach-Fuentes line of cases, Merchants National Bank found that
Rule C could be constitutional under the Sniadach-Fuentes criteria.
2. The Merchants National Bank Decision
Like the Amstar court, the Merchants National Bank court also
came to the conclusion that Rule C in rem arrests were constitu-
tional. However, its decision was supported by some conclusions con-
flicting with those of the Amstar decision. Although the court cited
the autonomy of maritime law, the court nonetheless conceded the
112. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
113. Kodiak Fishing Co. v. M/V Pacific Pride, 535 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Wash. 1982);
United States v. Life Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 732, 740 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
114. Polar Shipping, Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982);
But see Cooper Shipping Co. v. Century 21 Exposition, No. 82-535-Civ-T-GC (M.D. Fla.
1982).
[Vol. 29
ADMIRALTY IN REM & IN PERSONAM
applicability of common law precedent to admiralty in two ways:
1. The court dealt with jurisdictional issues taking into account
the Shaffer minimum contacts requirements.
2. The court validated Rule C in terms of the Sniadach-Fuentes
constitutional standards.
The Merchants National Bank court seemed determined to
meet all challenges, rather than avoid them. It could easily have
avoided the issue of common law jurisdictional requirements by
adopting the position of Judge Beeks in Bahama, that the Shaffer
rationale has no effect on the constitutionally protected autonomy of
admiralty law."' Instead, the court expended considerable energy
explaining that an in rem action, because of its use of the personifi-
cation theory, should technically be able to survive under Shaffer."'
Implicit in the courts rationale was the assumption that it matters
whether or not an in rem action is consistent with the Shaffer com-
mon law requirements.
The court dealt with the Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases in a
similar manner. Rather than assert only the autonomy of admiralty
law, the court conceded to common law control, but managed to fit
the in rem action into a fortunate Fuentes exception to the otherwise
fatal common law standards. The court found that in rem actions,
which have been commonplace procedures for centuries, were now
"extraordinary situations," and thus exceptions to the general rule
forbidding pre-hearing seizures.
While this approach to the preservation of maritime procedures
is, so far, workable, it has certain disadvantages. Assuming the
courts indeed desire to preserve maritime procedures, judges would
be required to write intricate opinions that maintain common law
applicibility to admiralty, but which somehow remove the case from
any effect of the common law. As the common law evolves, such
decisional acrobatics would need to be repeatedly enacted, constantly
explaining why the common law standards of constitutional protec-
tion still do not apply to the everyday maritime lien enforcement
devices.""
115. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
116. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dedge General G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1350 n.18
(5th Cir. 1981).
117. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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3. Current Judicial Priorities
The conflicting nature Merchant's Nalional Bank and Amstar
of these two cases is, perhaps, a result of the coincidence that they
were tried simultaneously by two courts of equal jurisdiction. This
coincidence brings to light another point which might otherwise go
undetected. The fact that the courts followed often incompatible lines
of reasoning to support the validity of maritime in rem actions sug-
gests that the courts were very result oriented. When faced with a
challenge to the continued survival of anciently established maritime
procedures, both courts somehow found a way for the procedures to
survive. They took different routes to that end (indeed, mutually ex-
clusive routes), but each court did what it deemed necessary to pre-
serve the traditional maritime procedures.
If only one of these cases had reached the court of appeals, or if
they had been chronologically staggered, or if they had proceeded on
similar premises of law, the cases might have appeared as more sin-
cere applications of law to fact than result oriented. Nonetheless, the
coincidence offers insight into the future of this area of law: higher
courts do not seem ready or likely to destabilize maritime law. The
preservation of maritime procedures seems to be a priority in the
courts of appeals. In the district courts of original jurisdiction, the
procedures have not always fared as well." 8 But the courts of appeal
for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have now made clear the result to
be obtained by district courts that do not want their decisions
reversed.
With two courts of appeal upholding the constitutionality of the
maritime procedures, one considering common law standards and
one not, a reader may ask whether or not it actually matters if com-
mon law is applicable to maritime matters.
C. The Importance of Preserving Maritime Autonomy
Since the time the decisions in Amstar and Merchants National
Bank were handed down, courts confronted with cases involving the
validity of maritime seizures have referred only generally to the re-
sults of Amstar and Merchants National Bank."9 So far, the courts
118. See Karl Senner, Inc. v. M/V Acadian Valor, 485 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. La. 1980)
(Rule C in rem arrests were held unconstitutional); Crysen Shipping Co. v. Bona Shipping
Co., 553 F. Supp. 139 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (Rule B attachment was found unconstitutional).
119. See Gulf Oil Trading Co. v. M/V Caribe Mar, 757 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1985);
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft v. A. Bottacchi, 732 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984); Polar Shipping,
Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 637 (9th Cir. 1982).
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have avoided dealing directly with the conflicting issues in the cases,
which means that, for the time being, the constitutionality of mari-
time seizures, particularly in rem actions, is well established, but it is
not perfectly clear why. Therefore, post-Amstar and Merchants Na-
tional Bank courts, in the few cases where the issue has arisen, typi-
cally avoid the "why" issue altogether.1 2 Perhaps one reason for this
is that once a decision is explicitly pinned to either Amstar or
Merchants National Bank reasoning, the losing party will be armed
with valid court of appeals precedent contradicting the reasoning ad-
versely applied to him. This situation could result in a great deal of
judicial inefficiency until one of the cases is overruled and it becomes
clear which theory of maritime seizure is constitutionally "correct."
The preceding analysis has found it comparatively disadvanta-
geous for admiralty law to be bound to the common law, the volatile
nature of which may follow courses incompatible with the nation's
maritime needs. For this reason, the possibility that courts in future
cases will trace the constitutionality of maritime seizure to the
Merchants National Bank reasoning, or overrule Amstar should be
seen as a danger. What would lead future courts to follow such a
path? Two possibilities follow, along with suggestions for their
avoidance.
First, the cases may happen to involve comparatively extraordi-
nary circumstances, tailor made for application of the common law
Fuentes "extraordinary situation" exception. Courts may naturally
prefer to neatly justify their holdings with the common law doctrine
used in Merchants National Bank, allowing seizure in such circum-
stances. This is hazardous because although the case at hand may be
especially appropriate, justifying a decision under the Merchants
National Bank common law discussion perpetuates (1) the illogical
notion that all in rem actions are somehow extraordinary, and (2)
the increasingly unjustifiable notion that admiralty procedures main-
tain constitutionality by fitting into current exceptions to common
law, rather than through maritime autonomy.
Second, the validity of a portion of the Amstar decision could
easily be challenged. The second half of the Amstar decision, aside
from "hypocritically" applying the common law Mullane due pro-
cess standards,121 also gives a very dubious constitutional justification
for the "notice" provided a vessel's owner in an in rem action. The
120. See Gulf Oil, 757 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1985); Schiffahrtsgesellschaft, 732 F.2d 1543,
1547 (11th Cir. 1984); Polar Shipping, 680 F.2d 627, 637 (9th Cir. 1982).
121. 664 F.2d 904, 910.
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court reasoned that a very effective way to notify a citizen of a legal
challenge against her is to deprive her of her property.' 22 This rea-
soning ignores the true dilemma. The complaint is that no notice
precedes the deprivation of property. True, the property may only be
held, as a guarantee for a plaintiff's claim, however, in the interim,
incapacitating a vessel can itself cause a monumental deprivation of
property to the vessel's owner. In the Merchants National Bank
trial, evidence was presented showing that a vessel seized by sur-
prise, and thus unprepared for lay-up, may suffer engine rust and
freeze up, corrosion and rust of electrical equipment, and general
deterioration and rusting of the hull, necessitating costly engine over-
haul and other repair expenses. 2 ' These economic losses are in ad-
dition to the obvious loss of income from use of the craft.
It is doubtful that the Mullane Court intended due process to
be interpreted as the deprivation of property. Indeed, the fifth
amendment was intended to guard against property deprivation tak-
ing place before the victim can blink his eyes.
It seems only a matter of time before this frightening interpreta-
tion of the Constitution inspires judicial reexamination. Unless care
is taken, that repair could have undesirable side effects. A future
court wishing to strike down this Orwellian interpretation of due
process could easily do so by overruling the Amstar decision. This
would leave Merchants National Bank as the sole controlling case
upholding the constitutionality of maritime enforcement procedures.
Future litigants and judges might then view the continued constitu-
tionality of the procedures as hinging on their ability to escape com-
mon law through common law exceptions.
D. Proposal
Future courts dealing with the Amstar due process interpreta-
tion problem would be well advised to consider the following alter-
natives to the outright invalidation of Amstar:
1. Acknowledge the internal inconsistency of Amstar, which
first held common law inapplicable to maritime matters on general
grounds, then applied Mullane common law standards without ex-
planations. Declare that the internal conflict is composed of one cor-
rect component (the declaration of maritime autonomy), and one in-
correct component (the subsequent explicit and unqualified
importation of common law). Fault the court for not adhering to
122. Id. at 911.
123. 663 F.2d 1338, 1339 (5th Cir. 1981).
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their original and correct premise of maritime autonomy, or
2. Identify, as the mistake in Amstar, the court's failure to offer
an explanation as to why the Mullane standards were adopted. Point
out that, because admiralty is an autonomous field of law, courts are
free to adopt common law precepts, if they wish, on an ad hoe basis.
However, such incorporation should be either clearly identified as
optional within the court's discretion, or should be limited to the
mere substance of the common law, and not identified as such. In
other words, if the court feels a particular case would be best decided
according to criteria similar to that of common law, it would be best
to characterize the criteria as the court's choice for deciding the spe-
cific facts of the case at bar, and not a wholesale importation of and
subsequent submission to common law.
The second option is especially favorable because it gives the
courts in admiralty the freedom to use whatever tools they feel can
give the fair and proper result, without forcing them to sacrifice the
traditional identity of admiralty.
Both of the above options enable the courts to carve from Am-
star the objectionable interpretation of due process. Yet they leave
intact both the autonomy of admiralty law and the conclusion of con-
stitutionality. At first blush, it would seem that destruction of Am-
star's due process justification would necessarily invalidate its con-
clusion. That, however, is not true. Amstar's due process justification
falters only after putting itself in the common law realm of Mullane.
There is no reason that judges in this autonomous field of law can-
not formulate due process standards that reflect the unique needs
and traditional nature of admiralty.
V. CONCLUSION
The nation's higher courts seem, at least for now, determined to
preserve the traditional maritime procedures long relied upon by liti-
gants in the courts of admiralty. This priority was made especially
clear by the two recent, simultaneously decided courts of appeal
cases, Amstar and Merchants National Bank. Both cases upheld the
constitutionality of Rule C in rem seizures, but used inconsistent
lines of reasoning to support their conclusions.
The goal of this comment has been to determine, in light of the
judicial priority of preserving maritime procedure, the best method
for achieving that goal, the method most compatible with the Consti-
tution and the common law on a long term basis, and the method
making the greatest contribution to judicial efficiency.
Merchants National Bank found in rem seizures to be constitu-
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tional by classifying them under the common law exception for ex-
traordinary situations. Such reasoning implies the potential for mari-
time subjectivity to common law standards.
Amstar, on the other hand, found reason to determine that ad-
miralty law should not be bound by common law doctrines. After
establishing this premise, in rem actions were found constitutional.
The court, however, after rejecting the common law standards on
generalized grounds of maritime autonomy, and without explana-
tion, imported common law criteria to judge the case.
Although the internal inconsistency of Amstar could endanger
its survival as precedent, its premise is actually preferable to
Merchant's National Bank as a basis for keeping maritime proce-
dures constitutional.
Specific suggestions are offered in the event that future courts
hear challenges to Amstar. Such challenges could easily arise in the
context of attacking the court's questionable interpretation of Mul-
lane's due process standards. The court asserted that a surprise
seizure, substantially equalling a deprivation of property, somehow
satisfied the due process requirement that such due process precede
the deprivation of property. A court hearing such a challenge and
desiring to eliminate that interpretation of Mullane's doctrine is en-
couraged to surgically remove the objectionable element, but to leave
Amstar's premise and conclusion intact as precedent for preserving
the principle of maritime autonomy. Maritime autonomy is the best
method for preserving the availability of traditional maritime proce-
dures for future litigants in the courts of admiralty.
David James DeMordaunt
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